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Abstract
With EuropeanUnion agencies becoming increasingly significant actors in European governance, further research is needed
to understand how they interact with their environment. Applying the ‘reputation’ literature to Europol, this article exam‐
ines in greater detail how agencies behave with their ‘informal’ audiences in comparison with the formal ones. It demon‐
strates that agencies are deeply invested in the shaping of their reputation, including towards their informal audiences
especially if the latter represent ‘reputational threats.’ Based on a quantitative analysis of activity reports and on a quali‐
tative study of the face‐to‐face engagements of Europol with the European Parliament over time, this research sheds light
on the complementary communicative strategies agencies can use to (re)present themselves depending on the dimension
of their reputation at stake.
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1. Introduction
The agencification, i.e., the proliferation of European
Union (EU) agencies since the 1990s, is depicted by
some commentators as the “New Paradigm of European
Governance” (Magnette, 2005) and has been well‐
documented in academic literature. This strong inter‐
est holds especially true on some specific dimensions of
agencification, for instance the motives behind the cre‐
ation of agencies or the interrelated matter of control
(Geradin et al., 2005; Pollack, 1997; Schout, 2012).
Scholars have also explored how these de novo bod‐
ies interact with their environment, especially with their
political masters, called ‘principals’ in the predominant
Principal‐Agent model. Academic works drawing on this
model assume an agent may over time develop its own
interests, and have shed light on the different strate‐
gies it can use to achieve them, e.g., exploiting the dis‐
agreements between its multiple principals (Dehousse,
2008) or voluntarily reducing the information asymme‐
try (Coremans & Keremans, 2017).
Nonetheless, the instrumental rationality underlying
this model tends to elide the role of representations,
ideas, and norms from the analysis of agencies’ deci‐
sions and actions, the latter assumed to be the result of
a cost‐benefit calculation (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017).
Furthermore, the explanatory power of the Principal‐
Agent model falls short in respect to how agencies
behave with those political institutions that do not fit in
the category of principals, i.e., not having initiated the
delegation of powers to the agency and unable to control
it. Indeed, the Principal‐Agent model has been mostly
elaborated to bring insights on the vertical relationships
an agency is part of, and, as such, has an “exclusive focus
on hierarchical, dyadic relations” (Delreux & Adriaensen,
2017, p. 2).
The novel research agenda based on the concept of
‘reputation’ in the field of EU agencies offers relevant
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insights to resolve these two issues, and is currently
migrating from the study of domestic organisations to be
applied at the EU stage, notably to understand EU agen‐
cies (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020a, 2020b; Rimkute, 2020).
On one hand, these recent publications have integrated
cognitive dimensions in the logics of action and in the
trajectory of an agency. On the other hand, these analy‐
ses pay attention to thewhole environment of an agency,
not only reputational issues in respect to its formal politi‐
cal masters but also to its informal audiences (other insti‐
tutions, media, citizens, interest groups, etc.).
Yet, the existing literature does not fully account if
agencies behave differently towards their informal audi‐
ences in comparison with their formal ones. One could
indeed assume that agencies would prioritise the shap‐
ing of their reputation in relation to their formal audi‐
ences over the informal ones, reputational issues being
a priori more critical with the former as they have legal
powers to control them, and even to sanction them
(Bach et al., 2021). A way to explore this question is
by comparing whether agencies adapt their reputational
strategies when informal audiences turn into formal
ones following changes of their legal basis. In that sense,
we suppose agencies would anticipate and react to such
legal transformations by further trying to shape their rep‐
utation in accordance with what they believe are the
expectations of their new master, so as to maintain a
strong level of autonomy.
To test this expectation, this article focuses on the
case of Europol, the EU law enforcement agency in
charge of facilitating the cooperation between national
law enforcement to fight crime and terrorism through
information exchanges, operational analysis, and exper‐
tise. Created in 1995 as an intergovernmental organi‐
sation, Europol became an EU agency when the 1995
Europol Convention (Council Act of 26 July 1995, 1995)
was replaced in 2009 by the Europol decision (Council
Decision of 6 April 2009, 2009). This formal trans‐
formation, reinforced by the 2016 Europol regulation
(Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016) replacing the 2009
decision, meant that, after having been an informal
audience deprived of any power on Europol for almost
15 years, the EP acquired the status of formal audi‐
ence. Acting as a principal together with the Council and
the European Commission, it can now modify the com‐
petences and design of the agency and it has gained
access to more information, obtained budgetary author‐
ity on the agency, and extended the topics on which
it has to be consulted by the Council. This article thus
explores whether Europol has intended to adjust its rep‐
utation to satisfy the EP, i.e., whether a change is vis‐
ible in the reputational strategy of the agency to con‐
form MEPs’ expectations after legal changes were per‐
formed in 2009. Reputational strategy seems even more
necessary in this case study as the EP was very critical
of Europol in the early 1990s (Resolution B4‐0732/95,
1995; Resolution A4‐0061/96, 1996), confirming its own
reputation of a liberal institution (Ripoll Servent, 2018;
Ripoll Servent & Trauner, 2014) and posing therefore
‘reputational threats’ to the agency (Gilad et al., 2015).
Based on the existing academic studies of the EP, risks
could exist therefore that MEPs would start using their
newly acquired formal prerogatives as soon as possi‐
ble to restrict or at least slow down the autonomy of
Europol, a security‐driven and long‐time intergovern‐
mental agency, in the name of a better balance with free‐
dom and of democracy.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it presents the
theoretical framework on which this study is grounded,
built around the concept of reputation. Then, based on
the existing scholarship, interviews and parliamentary
debates and reports, we detail the EP’s representations
in respect to Europol to fully operationalise our research
assumption, before detailing our quantitative and quali‐
tativemethodology. Finally, we shed light on the absence
of a sudden shift following the 2009 EP’s empowerment.
This continuity shows that the agency has been care‐
ful about the dominant representations of this audience
since the start of its activities. In doing so, our contribu‐
tion to the literature on agencies’ behaviour and repu‐
tation is twofold. On one hand, the variations in terms
of content between activity reports and face‐to‐face
engagement indicate that agencies have a differentiated
use of the communication tools from their repertoire.
On the other hand, agencies do not strictly prioritise for‐
mal audiences over informal ones, they rather seem to
address what they perceive as the main sources of repu‐
tational threats.
2. Reputation as a Social Representation
While the idea of reputation has been used to study
bureaucratic and organisational behaviours as soon as
the 1950s (Maor, 2018), the first conceptual works on it
and definitional attempts are much more recent. They
are mostly attributed to Daniel Carpenter (2001, 2010)
who defined it as “the set of beliefs about an organi‐
sation’s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that
are embedded in a network of multiple audiences”
(Carpenter, 2010, p. 45). This scholar offered new per‐
spectives on agencies by accounting for the complex‐
ity of their environment due to the “existence of mul‐
tiple expectations by multiple audiences and the con‐
text of today’s knowledge society and blame culture”
(Maor, 2018, p. 18).Mainly applied to the domestic stage,
the concept of reputation is increasingly used to analyse
agencies at the EU level, where the above‐mentioned
characteristics tend to be exacerbated (Rimkute, 2020).
These works start from three considerations.
Firstly, reputation is thought as multifaceted.
Four dimensions of reputation can be distinguished
(Carpenter, 2010). Two relate to the outputs: the tech‐
nical (does the agency possess sufficient technical and
analytical capacity and skills?) and performative (does
the agency fulfil its formal missions and attain its goals?)
aspects. The other two are rather about the agency’s
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inputs: the legal‐procedural (does the agency follow
fair procedures and rules?) and moral (does the agency
engage in ethical behaviour and contribute to the safe‐
guarding of the most important values?) reputational
matters. Therefore, studying an agency’s reputation
cannot be simplified to observing whether an agency
does or does not have a reputation per se, rather it
means the identification of the technical, performa‐
tive, legal‐procedural and moral reputation of an agency.
As expressed by Carpenter and Krause:
If reputation is reduced to simply a binary or mono‐
tonic choice or outcome pertaining to what a public
agency has or does not have, or that an agency has
‘more’ or ‘less’ of, much of the richness of administra‐
tive behaviour will be lost to the analyst. (2012, p. 31)
Secondly, the reputation literature pays specific atten‐
tion to audiences. Indeed, reputation is how differ‐
ent audiences perceive what an agency is and does.
Audiences are “any individual or collective that observes
a regulatory organisation and can judge it” (Carpenter,
2010, p. 33). They can be formal, what the Principal‐
Agent model calls ‘principals,’ or informal, the constel‐
lation of actors and organisations being part of the
agency’s environment. Each of these audiences has its
own representations since every audience evaluates the
identity and activities of the agency according to its own
norms. Furthermore, not all audiences will value the
same dimension of an agency’s reputation according to
their own dominant values and criteria. For instance,
some will be more attached to performative or techni‐
cal facets, pushing the moral and legal‐procedural ones
to the background. Considering these elements is crucial
as, argued by Carpenter and Kraus, “audience members’
behaviours toward government agencies are a function
of their beliefs” (2012, p. 26).
Thirdly, reputation as a set of beliefs is not immutable
or frozen; it can evolve. Agencies themselves can try
to act upon their perceptions among external audi‐
ences through communicative strategies, whether to
cultivate their reputation when it is positive or, above
all, to change the representations of themselves held
within their environment when those are negative.
Communication can also be used to model the expec‐
tations of audiences (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020b; Wood,
2018). Scholars have highlighted how agencies are usu‐
ally very active in their communication as their auton‐
omy is a function of their reputation. Autonomy can
be defined as the capacity of an agency to implement
its own ideas, to deal with its own business and to
benefit from a certain leeway in its actions and deci‐
sions (Busuioc et al., 2011; Carpenter, 2001; Groenleer,
2009). To this end, scholars have shown that reputation
turns out to be an ‘asset’ (Maor, 2018; Rimkute, 2020).
Indeed, when an agency meets the expectations of its
formal audiences about its capacities, intentions, history,
and mission, audiences are more encouraged to extend
its formal mandate and authority and/or have fewer
motives to exert control over it and hence to restrict its
autonomy (Carpenter, 2010; Gilad & Yogev, 2012; Maor,
2018). This holds true even in respect to informal audi‐
ences insofar as they would offer support to an agency
whose representations comply with all their beliefs. That
support can be crucial for agencies to avoid criticism and
disempowerment or to fulfil their tasks, as they rarely
benefit from constraining powers. In gaining that sup‐
port, agencies can expand their autonomy beyond their
formal powers (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020a, 2020b).
Nevertheless, agencies can only try to shape their
reputation; the results of their actions are not guaran‐
teed and are not always the ones they hoped for. Indeed,
reputation being multi‐faceted, agencies need to jug‐
gle to find the right balance between the four compo‐
nents mentioned above and can struggle in this process
(Busuioc&Rimkute, 2020a; Carpenter, 2010). In addition,
in their attempt to gain support fromone audience, agen‐
cies take the risk of alienating others that have differ‐
ent norms. Consequently, agencies do not fully control
how their communication will be interpreted by exter‐
nal actors and can be confronted with the need to make
difficult decisions on the dimension of their reputation
they choose to emphasise the most and on what sup‐
port they need the most. In that situation, scholars have
identified that agencies would be “selectively respond‐
ing to, and actively shaping, expectations of audiences
‘that matter’—on whose support they depend” (Busuioc
& Rimkute, 2020b, p. 1259).
Yet, little is known about what the key audiences for
an agency are, the ones ‘that matter,’ and whether a dis‐
tinction between informal and formal audiences is oper‐
ated by agencies in their reputational communication.
Away to explore this research question is to compare the
attention paid by an agency to a specific audience, before
Table 1. Summary of organisational reputation dimensions.
Reputational dimensions Signals that the agency sends to audiences
Technical Agency sends strong professional and technical signals
Performative Agency emphasises its ability to attain goals set in its formal mandate
Legal‐procedural Agency emphasises a thorough engagement in socially acknowledged procedures
Moral Agency signals its commitment to wide moral implications and the ethical aspects
of its conduct
Source: based on Rimkute (2020, p. 389).
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and after it acquires formal powers to control and even
sanction it. We assume that the agency would adapt to
changes of its legal basis by being much more careful
about the expectations of this audience and would fur‐
ther try to shape its reputation in accordance with the
dominant representations of its new master to preserve
the most its autonomy. To test it, this article focuses on
the reputational game of Europol, created as an organ‐
isation exclusively controlled by national governments
before becoming an EU agency with the 2009 decision.
This legal changemeant that the EP, an informal audience
for 15 years, turned into a formal one and gained control
and sanction powers, such as hearings of the executive
director or blocking of the discharge procedure.
Our initial expectation of the agency strongly adapt‐
ing its communication after this formal change is even
stronger here as the EP could have been perceived by
Europol as a source of ‘reputational threats,’ i.e., of “chal‐
lenges that pose a threat to the agency’s established rep‐
utation, consisting of external opinions and allegations
from (a) particular audience(s)” (Gilad et al., 2015 p. 452).
Indeed, scholars depict the EP as a ‘liberal’ institution
and such position appears in the first very critical public
statements the institution issued in respect to Europol,
calling for a better data protection framework and more
democratic control of the newly created organisation
(Resolution B4‐0732/95, 1995; Resolution A4‐0061/96,
1996). The existing literature has highlighted how, when
facing reputational threats, agencies can be very active
in their communication to ensure their survival through
their annual reports (Rimkute, 2020), public statements
(Bach et al., 2021) or even strategically remaining silent
(Maor et al., 2013). One could therefore expect that the
EP’s empowerment in respect to Europol would inten‐
sify the perception of these threats, making reputational
issues particularly acute for the agency and leading to a
sudden adjustment from the agency. To fully verify this
assumption, we need first to assess MEPs’ expectations
towards Europol and then to analysewhether the agency
has attempted to further take them into consideration in
its communication following the legal empowerment of
the EP.
3. Political Cleavages and Conflicting Expectations
within the EP
The first public judgements issued by theMEPs shed light
on the prevalence of the legal‐procedural and ethical
dimensions in their assessment of Europol. Yet, MEPs’
expectations have turned out to be much more com‐
plex and the dominant representations within the insti‐
tution have also evolved following European elections,
exogenous events, and formal changes. In this section,
we consider political groups as the units of analysis as
they reflect ideological stances and are key determinants
of the positions adopted by MEPs (Ripoll Servent, 2017).
We hence selected quotations that were especially rep‐
resentative of the positions adopted by each political
group, whatever the nationality of the individual MEP, at
each transformation of Europol’s legal bases.
Firstly, the EP is far from being a homogenous insti‐
tution and its changing composition between the 1990s
and the 2010s has impacted the dominant expecta‐
tions held towards Europol, especially following the elec‐
toral successes of the European People’s Party (EPP),
a right/centre‐right wing party. The EPP has exhibited
since the 1990s strong concerns for internal security, fol‐
lowing the abolition of internal border controls between
member states, calling for solutions to solve this prob‐
lem (Ripoll Servent, 2017). One of the ideas advocated
by members of the EPP was the setting up of a struc‐
tured European police cooperation (EP, 1992) and since
then the EPP has had strong expectations in relation
to Europol’s performance, expecting it to achieve the
goals set in its formalmandate: the effective fight against
crime and terrorism. This position clearly appears dur‐
ing plenary debates dedicated to Europol’s legal bases.
For instance, in 2008 various EPP members urged the
rest of the hemicycle to support Europol’s operational
expansion to make it more effective, without waiting for
even stronger data protection or a reinforced role for
the EP insofar as, according to them: “We need secu‐
rity now, which means we need Europol now” (Hubert
Pirker, Austria, EPP; EP, 2008). This position was reiter‐
ated during the 2016 plenary debates dedicated to the
second reading of Europol regulation, with declarations
such as “reinforcing Europol means reinforcing the pro‐
tection and security of the citizens of the EU” (Stefano
Maullu, Italy, EPP; EP, 2016).
While the EPP has gradually become the largest polit‐
ical groupwithin the EP, it was in the early 1990s only sec‐
ond, behind the Socialist group. Yet,MEPs from this latter
group had at that time different expectations towards
Europol, as illustrated by their rejection of the 1995
report on Europol convention, written by EPP Harmut
Nassauer. Being by then numerically dominant, Socialists
were able to oppose the numerous amendments made
by the EPP insisting on the risks created by interna‐
tional crime and the urgent need to establish Europol.
Their representation was mostly due, in the early 2000s,
to the very few powers granted to the EP in Europol’s
creation and governance. Its intergovernmental nature
worsened the existing suspicion in regard to Europol, first
announced as a European FBI. This distrust was even
stronger as the negotiations of the 1995 Convention
were held in a very opaque and secret way, a source
of “bred misconceptions” (Busuioc et al., 2011, p. 856)
about what Europol was and how it was controlled.
The arrest in 2001 of a Europol staff member on the
grounds of financial misappropriation did nothing to dis‐
perse these fears.
However, socialist MEPs have gradually shifted their
expectations towards this agency. They now favourmore
and more output prospects in relation to the agency and
have stopped blocking its operational expansion since
the early 2000s. This change appears in 2008 during the
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plenary debates about the new legal basis of Europol:
“We are finally in a position to make Europol into a con‐
crete and effective tool in combating organised crime, as
well as many other dangerous types of crime which are
nowmanifesting themselves at European level” (Claudio
Fava, Italy, PSE; EP, 2008); and then again in 2014
during the debates on Europol regulation: “I believe
that a strong cooperation agency for the various police
authorities is fundamental in the strategy to fight organ‐
ised country, and that a strong Europol is important”
(Salvatore Caronna, Italy, S&D; EP, 2014).
The renewed expectations of socialist MEPs are
partly due to exogenous events relating to internal secu‐
rity. Indeed, the EP being amajoritarian institution,MEPs
are elected by EU citizens who want their concerns to be
taken care of by their representatives. Since the 1970s,
internal security has become a growing electoral topic
(Eurobarometer, 2013, 2018), especially after events as
terrorist attacks or major criminal discoveries. EU citi‐
zens have hence exerted strong pressures towards their
elected representatives to take further steps to guar‐
antee their security. Thus, the previous quotes make
clear that, contrary to the early 1990s, socialist MEPs
have insisted since the 2000s on the threat international
crime and terrorism represent and have been looking for
solutions to this problem, contributing to the shift from
input reputational aspects being prioritised to the grow‐
ing importance of output ones.
On top of this potential explanation, a broader nor‐
mative development of the EP in Justice and Home
Affairs has beenwitnessed by different scholars since the
Lisbon Treaty. With its new status of co‐legislator in this
domain, new norms became dominant as co‐decision
amplifies the weight of the major political groups and
encourages the smaller ones to support the big ones
so as to avoid being side‐lined (Carrera et al., 2013;
Hausemer, 2006; Ripoll Servent, 2010, 2012). In Justice
and Home Affairs, it has meant aligning with the EPP’s
expectations in terms of outputs, as the Council and the
EPP, the dominant group since the 1999 elections, have
insisted on the need for MEPs to act ‘responsibly’ (Ripoll
Servent, 2010, 2018), i.e., to adopt a ‘realistic’ stance and
to put an end to “Christmas wish lists” (Ripoll Servent,
2012, p. 67).
Nevertheless,MEPs payingmore attention and priori‐
tising the output reputational aspects of Europol does
not mean that they omitted input dimensions from
their expectations nor that reputational threats on the
agency have disappeared (Rimkute, 2020). For instance,
legal‐procedural and moral expectations have not been
completely inexistent in the EPP’s expectations towards
Europol’s activities. EPP’s concerns regarding the con‐
trol over the agency and its respect for fundamental
rights and freedoms (especially data protection, trans‐
parency, and democracy) have been strong since the
1990s. The need for the agency to integrate these two
imperatives in its daily work has been recalled by MEPs
from this group, in the various reports they wrote on
Europol’s legal bases (Resolution A4‐0061/96, 1996) or
during plenary debates (EP, 2008, 2014).
In addition, similarly to other JHA matters (Ripoll
Servent, 2018), one should not over homogenise the EP,
as recalled by a former member of Europol’s direction:
The views about Europol in the EP are much more
diverse and that reflects the diversity of political opin‐
ions and interest groups that are in the EP. So, tradi‐
tionally, you have everything from left to right and up
and down, you have many MEPs, who are concerned
about privacy issues, secret State agenda and so on,
who have traditionally expressed somedistrust about
institutions like Europol, and some who have been
directly challenging Europol’s work, being sometimes
hostile towards Europol. On the other side, normally
on the EPP and towards the right you have people
who strongly support the work of Europol, especially
in terrorism. (Interview A, former director of Europol,
July 2017, The Hague)
Furthermore, some political groups have kept prioritis‐
ing legal‐procedural andmoral expectations in respect to
Europol, such asMEPs belonging to the European United
Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group. This group has
not demonstrated a level of concern for internal secu‐
rity similar to the EPP for instance, with very few men‐
tions of it during debates. The main threat to EU cit‐
izens and states in these MEPs’ eyes does not seem
to be international crime or terrorism themselves, but
rather any potential breach to citizens’ rights and free‐
doms Europol could be responsible for, in the name of
the fight against criminals and terrorists. Contrary to
the Socialist group, no major transformation of their
expectations is observed in the public declarations of
the GUE/NGL group, whether in 2008—”There is no
real possibility of controlling the inaccessible citadel
of Europol or of restricting its enforcement activities”
(Athanasios Pafilis, Greece, GUE/NGL; EP, 2008)—or in
2016—”We are opposed to this agency being granted sig‐
nificant powers while being strongly opaque and out of
public scrutiny” (MarinaAlbiol Guzmán, Spain, GUE/NGL;
EP, 2016).
Consequently, European elections, exogenous events
and formal changes have made MEPs’ representations
much more complex in respect to Europol: Not only
the agency is expected to effectively fight crime and
terrorism and to display specific expertise, but MEPs
are also very careful with moral and legal‐procedural
considerations. What does it mean for the operational‐
ising of our main assumption? The existing literature
on reputation has demonstrated that the two ‘output’
reputational facets are usually dominant in the reputa‐
tional work undertaken by EU agencies as they reflect
their very ‘raison d’être’ (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020b) in
the EU regulatory State (Majone, 1997). Indeed, these
de novo non‐majoritarian bodies would above all be cre‐
ated to deliver solutions to the problems met at the
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EU level through the providing of expertise and knowl‐
edge without any political interference. Thus, technical
reputation is commonly emphasised by EU agencies as
“technocratic expertise [is] the key criterion for legiti‐
mation above all others” (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020b,
p. 1261), and the performative dimension is similarly
central in their communicative strategies as “expertise
then provides the means through which EU agencies
deliver” (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020b, p. 1261). Therefore,
we could expect that, independently from its legal basis,
Europol has also strongly underlined these two rep‐
utational dimensions since the start of its activities.
Conversely, considering the whole spectrum of the con‐
flicting MEPs’ expectations and the reputational threats
lead us to assume that Europol’s potential adjustments
to the EP’s empowerment to ensure its own autonomy,
and even survival, would be translated by the agency bet‐
ter balancing the different dimensions of its reputation,
outputs and inputs. In other words, Europol having antic‐
ipated the transformations of its legal basis and attempt‐
ing to satisfy its new formal audience would be con‐
firmed if in its communications a shift appears from2009,
with Europol equally presenting itself as a performative
and ethical organisation holding a high level of exper‐
tise and strongly committed to respect the fair and due
decision‐making processes. We offer to test this assump‐
tion through a quantitative and qualitative methodology.
4. Methodology
Agencies have different tools at their disposal to shape
their reputation. Oneof these instruments is their annual
activity reports. According to Busuioc and Rimkute,
“annual reports are an important (and thus far largely
untapped) source for mapping how EU agencies present
themselves to a broad range of audiences” (2020a,
p. 555). Analysing these reports can be useful to under‐
stand the reputational game of an agency over time and
to trace back its potential changes as it is a requirement
for EU agencies to produce activity reports every year.
Other tools, not being issued at a similar periodicity, do
not offer the same insights in respect to long‐term anal‐
yses. In addition, far from being a neutral reporting of
their activities, these documents are used strategically
by agencies which are quite free in their preparation.
They purposefully select the information they wish to
disseminate and the way it should appear, and hence
which facets of their reputation they chose to build and
emphasise (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020a). The importance
of these documents appears in the care agencies take
to prepare these reports. Europol illustrates it perfectly.
While its first activity reports were quite simple and activ‐
ities were resumed on a blank page, over the years they
have become increasingly sophisticated in respect to
their formatting and their content. The efforts invested in
the writing of activity reports makes sense when consid‐
ering the diversity of audiences they are directed to and
the role they play in agencies’ governance, including in
respect to the EP’s control. Until 2009 Europol’s activity
reports were the only information produced by Europol
that MEPs had access to. Since then, they are one of
the documents MEPs refer to during the budgetary dis‐
charge procedure, extracting indicators and numbers
from the reports to justify their decision (e.g., EP, 2021).
Consequently, these documents appeared until 2009 as
the main written channel and, since then, as one of
the principal channels for Europol to (re)present itself
to MEPs.
These characteristics explain why we paid a spe‐
cific attention to Europol’s annual activity reports from
1999 to 2019. Our expectation in respect to Europol’s
entrepreneurship vis‐à‐vis the EP would be confirmed
if we observe a potential balance over time, especially
in the late 2000s, between the space the agency has
granted in these documents to the four dimensions of
its activities and identity. Quantitative methods enable
us to identify which dimensions of its reputation Europol
has showcased from 1999 to 2020 by considering with
NVivo their frequency of occurrence in its successive
annual activity reports (see Supplementary File 1 for fur‐
ther information).
Three limits to this method can be highlighted. A first
comment needs to be made in respect to the 2001
annual report. The latter was not included in the study
as it turned out to be unexploitable, the format not
allowing any word search. However, as the analysis is
based on reports from 1999 to 2019, the absence of one
annual report on such a long period of time should not
alter our result. Secondly, word counting and quantita‐
tive approaches cannot grasp all the nuances as words
are used inmore complex communication structures and
make sense only when reading the whole sentence or
even the entire paragraph. This matter is already identi‐
fied by Busuioc and Rimkute: “If agencies use ‘technical’
words to convey a ‘moral’ message our study would not
be able to capture it” (2020a, p. 557). Thirdly, even with
tests on samples, coding necessarily means that some
selecting is performed. Therefore, we cannot pretend to
have been exhaustive in this process. Other researchers
could have identified different and additional keywords
to operationalise the different facets of a reputation, or
the list could have been extended. Nevertheless, theway
we designed our research strategy pushes those possible
biases at themargins andwould not question our results,
which aim less at offering a precise counting than at ren‐
dering the broad evolutions of Europol’s communication
on a 20‐year period. Keeping this research goal in mind
also explains why we chose to analyse our results based
on trendlines rather than on raw numbers, so as to miti‐
gate the impact of the above‐mentioned limitations.
Furthermore, we complemented our quantita‐
tive material by a qualitative one as another impor‐
tant communication channel agencies can use in
their reputational strategies is “face‐to‐face engage‐
ment” (Wood, 2018, p. 409). The latter is one of the
three “entrepreneurship methods” identified by Wood,
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alongside media communication (social media, tradi‐
tional media, institutional website) and “knowledge
development and learning” (training sessions, sharing
of expertise). However, these two tools are less relevant
in the case of Europol’s addressing the EP: While media
communication is very broad and Europol has no guar‐
antee MEPs will read it, knowledge development and
learning, as “epistemic exercises” (Wood, 2018, p. 410)
aiming at strengthening professional skills, are rather
directed to other audiences, e.g., law enforcement offi‐
cials in our case study.
‘Face‐to‐face engagement’ covers a range of dif‐
ferent activities, such as networking activities, confer‐
ences, consultation. It matches with some legal require‐
ments, for instance, the Europol Executive Director,
the Chairperson of the Management Board or their
Deputies shall appear in front of MEPs when requested
(Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016, article 51 §2(a)) or
Europol activity reports by the Executive Director are
requested by the EP (Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016,
preamble §60). Face‐to‐face engagement also includes
non‐compulsory practices, such as MEPs visiting the
agency’s seat. The content of these activities and the
way they are used by the agency to shape its reputation
are difficult to apprehend through quantitative meth‐
ods. Instead, we used a qualitativemethodology combin‐
ing different material. An interview with Europol’s direc‐
tor, conducted in 2017 and part of a broader research
project, is used and complemented by someopen‐access
documents enabling us to understand the face‐to‐face
engagement practices set up by the agency in relation to
MEPs (speeches within the European hemicycle, agenda
of the visit to the agency’s seat in The Hague) and their
content. As these instruments involve a limited audi‐
ence, we could expect the agency to use them for tailor‐
made ends, to particularly answer the expectations of
this audience.
5. A complex Reputational Game
Our results are detailed as follows. We start by exploring
which facets of its reputation Europol has attempted to
convey through its annual activity reports, then through
face‐to‐face engagement, in order to confirm whether
the agency has anticipated the 2009 transformation of
the EP into one of its political masters and to test if it pri‐
oritises formal audiences over informal ones. In this case,
it would have tried to fulfil its conflicting expectations,
balancing the output aspects of its reputation with the
input ones.
5.1. Managing a Multi‐Faceted Reputation through
Activity Reports
Applying our quantitative methodology, figure 1 offers
a visualisation of the evolution of the appearance per‐
centage of each reputational facet in Europol’s activity
reports over time.
A first look at this figure seems to confirm what
the pre‐existing literature on reputation demonstrated:
Agencies would become more “reputationally‐astute
and over time expand their toolbox of reputational
strategies” (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020a, p. 566). While
the technical dimension was clearly predominant over
the three other aspects of reputation in 1999, a better
balance was gradually achieved. Indeed, the linear trend
of the legal‐procedural dimension is ascending and so is
the moral one, even if to a much lesser extent, with a
small bump of both in 2009, when the EP became one of
Europol’s principals. Here lies a slight difference between
our results and the existing literature. For instance,
according to Rimkute andBusuioc,while ageing, EU agen‐
cies would grant less importance to the moral dimen‐
sion of their reputation and this decrease would be








































































































Figure 1. Evolution of the highlighted reputational dimensions.
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In our case study, such result could be a confirmation of
Europol anticipating the transformation of its legal basis
and the reinforced powers of the EP.
Nonetheless, the biggest ‘winner’ of the readjust‐
ment initiated by Europol over time is its reputational
performative facet. It has gained more and more atten‐
tion in the agency’s annual reports, especially since 2015
and the new format of reports (the ‘consolidated annual
activity report’). In addition, although the linear trend
of the technical aspect is descending, no major gap can
be witnessed between 1999 and 2019 and this dimen‐
sion became even stronger in 2009. Therefore, the tech‐
nical and performative matters have remained the rep‐
utational dimensions Europol has emphasised the most
since the start of its activities. This imbalance in favour
of reputational outputs in Europol’s annual reports con‐
firms the existing literature in respect to these dimen‐
sions being predominant in the communication issued
by EU agencies as they are their ‘raison d’être,’ even
when facing reputational threats (Rimkute, 2020). It also
makes sense when taking into account the diversity of
audiences targeted by these documents. Annual reports
are used by Europol to (re)present itself not only to par‐
liamentarians, but also, among others, to national law
enforcement services. The latter had to be convinced of
the technical expertise and the capacity of the agency
to fulfil its missions, to be effective. Hence, the strong
focus of Europol on these two aspects partly relates to
the need for the agency to persuade national police offi‐
cers to enter the data they took time to obtain into the
European law enforcement databases.
Although these accounts shed light on the imbalance
between its different reputational facets performed by
Europol in its activity reports, our research question is
far from being answered.While the legal‐procedural and
moral dimensions have gradually gained more weight in
annual reports, this evolution remains limited without
any major turning point and the input aspects are still
far from the output ones. In other words, Europol does
not seem to have suddenly used its annual reports to
frame its reputation in accordance with the multidimen‐
sional expectations of the EP after the latter became a
formal audience. We argue in the following sub‐section
for the need for researchers to pay attention to the
panel of agencies’ practices to get the ‘full picture’ of
their interactions with their audiences. This is espe‐
cially the case of face‐to‐face engagement, creatingmore
intimate contacts and potentially offering the opportu‐
nity to an agency to answer the expectations of a spe‐
cific audience.
5.2. Face‐to‐Face Engagement: A Tailor‐Made Tool?
While performative and technical reputational dimen‐
sions have remained predominant over time in compar‐
ison with the input aspects in annual activity reports,
it appears that Europol has mostly used face‐to‐face
engagements with MEPs to focus more restrictively on
the input expectations. Nonetheless, contrary to our
expectations, the agency has not simply adjusted its
communication after the EP formally became one of its
politicalmasters able to control it: Europol has paid atten‐
tion to the EP’s representations since it started its activ‐
ities in the 1990s, demonstrating its strong care to infor‐
mal audiences.
Indeed, as soon as the 1990s, effective face‐to‐face
exchanges were initiated by Europol and went beyond
the legal requirements. In the 1990s, without being com‐
pelled to do it, Europol answered regularly to the MEPs’
information requests, sent them information, planned
visits of MEPs to its seat in The Hague, and accepted
the invitations of the EP’s committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs to come to Brussels to explain
their activities and answer their questions (Busuioc,
2010; Trauner, 2012). In these circumstances, adding to
some public statements (Bruggeman, 2006), representa‐
tives of Europol were very active in trying to convince
MEPs about the agency’s respect for due and fair pro‐
cesses and the ethical nature of its work. For instance,
Jürgen Storbeck, the agency’s director from1999 to 2004,
stated in front of MEPs that “parliamentary control of
Europol is currently unclear,” claiming that stronger and
more efficient democratic control would be in Europol’s
own interest (EP, 2003).
In doing so, Europol was willing to reduce informa‐
tion asymmetries so as to mitigate the existing doubts
and critics addressed to the agency by MEPs, although
they were only an informal audience, according to one
of Europol’s former directors:
The more I have been involved and the more Europol
has been exposed to the EP, the better it has been
to demystify Europol. Some of the assumptions that
we are collecting despite of privacy rights are eroded
because of the way in which Europol is managing this
and is taking privacy concerns in a very strong way.
(Interview A)
This attempt to positively shape its legal‐procedural and
moral reputations by presenting itself as willing to be
more controlled than the legal requirements,more trans‐
parent, and more attentive to data protection issues
persisted in the 2000s and 2010s. For instance, in its
2010 annual report, Europol submitted the idea of its
multiannual and annual working programmes to be dis‐
cussed by the EP and called for more frequent visits
from MEPs to be scheduled to its seat. These visits are
opportunities for Europol to present aspects of gover‐
nance, oversight, financial and administrative manage‐
ment, data protection, alongside more operational brief‐
ings (EP, 2017; Europol, 2013). Similarly, Europol wrote a
very detailed information note for the EP about the trans‐
fer of financial data from the agency to the United States.
Without being obliged to do it, the aim of the agency
was to reassure MEPs about its activities (Trauner, 2012).
Finally, a former Europol’s director explained to us how
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he multiplied his trips to Brussels to appear more trans‐
parent and subject to democratic control:
Europol becoming an EU agency and becoming more
integrated therefore into the EU institutions domain
allowed me as the director to appear much more fre‐
quently before the LIBE committee to meet more fre‐
quentlyMEPs. And I think it has ledmanyMEPs to feel
a little bit of ownership for Europol. So today Europol
has probably the most positive profile or reputation
in the EP for a long time. (Interview A)
If a more systematic exploration of face‐to‐face engage‐
ment practices is required, it nonetheless appears in
the above‐mentioned examples that Europol has initi‐
ated itself direct interactions with MEPs, even when
not required to do so, to shape their representations.
However, contrary to what we expected, Europol did
not shift its practices following legal changes as it paid
attention toMEPs’ representations evenwhen theywere
restricted to the role and powers of an informal audience.
Such effort could relate to the perception by an agency
of a ‘reputational threat’ posed by the EP, very critical
of its identity and activities in the early 1990s, although
it was only an informal audience by that time. EP’s pub‐
lic statements on the insufficient democratic control of
Europol and on its lack of respect for fundamental free‐
doms could have been perceived by the agency as detri‐
mental to its autonomy and legitimacy. Therefore, these
results confirm the idea that agencies “react to reputa‐
tional threats through communicative behaviours” (Bach
et al., 2021, p. 2). However, we demonstrate here that
they can also use face‐to‐face engagements to address
these risks, and not only public declarations (Bach et al.,
2021, p. 2), annual reports (Rimkute, 2020) or remain‐
ing silent (Maor et al., 2013). This reaction could indi‐
cate that the audiences ‘that matter’ for agencies are
not exclusively the ones benefitting from more power
on them, but rather the ones posing the highest repu‐
tational threats.
6. Conclusion
This article offers more insights on the relationship
between an agency and its audienceswith the concept of
‘reputation.’ The emerging co‐decision norms following
formal changes and the renewed context of internal secu‐
rity have contributed to a rebalancing over time between
output‐ and input‐oriented expectations for a majority
of left‐wing MEPs. Together with the electoral victories
of right‐wing MEPs already driven by technical and per‐
formative dimensions, these evolutions lead to complex
expectations of MEPs towards Europol without ending
reputational threats over the agency. Complementing
the existing literature on reputation, audiences, and
threats, we demonstrated that these conflicting repre‐
sentations were addressed by Europol through a com‐
bination of tools, articulating the different facets of an
agency’s reputation. In those instruments dedicated to
a general audience, Europol mostly emphasised its out‐
put reputational aspects—technical expertise and per‐
formative power—, corresponding to their ‘raison d’être’
in the EU regulatory State (Busuioc & Rimkute, 2020b).
Yet, more tailor‐made and face‐to‐face strategies (Wood,
2018) were also deployed by the agency when it came
to its input reputational dimensions—legal‐procedural
and moral facets. Nevertheless, no sudden shift appears
in Europol’s reputational game following legal changes:
No major rupture can be observed in terms of content
and strategies after the EP acquired formal powers on
the agency. Legal changes have hence only intensified
pre‐existing dynamics, proving the strong care taken by
an agency to (re)present itself to informal audiences and
that formal ones are not the only audiences ‘thatmatter.’
Based on a single case study, this article calls for fur‐
ther research on EU agencies’ differentiated strategies
in respect to audiences and to the reputational dimen‐
sions at stake. To this respect, a question to explore is
whether agencies use face‐to‐face engagement to shape
their reputation on inputs dimensions, while they would
rather be more public when their ‘raison d’être’ reputa‐
tional dimensions are attacked.
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